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Four questions were central to our investigation:
What are the differences between misinformation and disinformation, and do these differences
help to identify one or the other?
2. What are the hallmarks of misinformation and disinformation?
3. Do you have a proposed process for evaluating information found on open-source media?
4. What current and potential future tools could be used to support this process?
1.

To address these questions, we created:
1. Information literacy video tutorials that instruct on the differences and links between
mis/disinformation;
2. A social listening dashboard that uses machine learning to identify the hallmarks of
mis/disinformation;
3. Flowcharts for quickly determining if a social media post might be mis/disinformation;
4. Checklists to evaluate information on open-source media;
5. A policy report that highlights the current and future tools, and the primary mechanisms of
dis/misinformation.
These deliverables are available at https://diplomacy-lab.lib.purdue.edu/.
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Identifying Dis/misinformation on Social Media
Dis/misinformation was a significant concern in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and has only
worsened in recent years. Even though domestic actors often spread dis/misinformation, actors abroad can
use it to spread confusion and push their agenda to the detriment of American citizens. Even though this
report focuses on actors outside the United States, the methods they use are universal and can be adapted
to work against domestic agents. A solid understanding of these methods is the first step in combating
foreign dis/misinformation campaigns and creating a new information literacy paradigm.
This report highlights the primary mechanisms of dis/misinformation: multimedia manipulation, bots,
astroturfing, and trolling. These forms of dis/misinformation were selected after thorough research about
common pathways dis/misinformation are spread online. Multimedia manipulation details image, video,
and audio dis/misinformation in the form of deepfakes, memes, and out-of-context images. Bots are
automated social media accounts that are not managed by humans and often contribute to
dis/misinformation campaigns. Astroturfing and trolls use deception to sway media users to join false
grassroots campaigns and utilize emotionally charged posts to provoke a response from users.
This policy report also defines case studies of disinformation in China, Russia, and Iran, outlining
common patterns of dis/misinformation specific to these countries. These patterns will allow for more
accurate and quick identification of dis/misinformation from the outlined countries by State Department
Watch Officers. Recommendations are also provided for each type of disinformation. They include a list
of what individuals should look for and how to ensure that the information they receive is accurate and
from a reputable source. The appendix at the end of the paper lists all of the tools and recommendations in
one place. This report intends to aid State Department Watch Officers as they work to identify foreign
developments accurately, but researchers may also find this information helpful in anticipating future
developments in foreign dis/misinformation campaigns.
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Introduction
The advent of the internet allowed for the sharing of information on a mass scale. Its impact has become
more apparent with the growing use of social media as a legitimate source of news, global updates, and
intelligence. While initially, there were hopes that the internet would serve as a democratizing agent,
events in recent years have highlighted the many challenges accompanying the benefits of the internet.
The United States became acutely aware of these issues of online dis/misinformation following a growing
conversation around the role of bots, trolls, and other online manipulation strategies during the 2016
presidential election.
In light of these recent events, it is more necessary than ever to recognize the signs of and discern
information challenges in the media as state and non-state actors continue to misrepresent and obscure
truth to divide public opinion, encourage chaos, and promote their agendas. This introduction will
differentiate between misinformation, disinformation, and malinformation. Additionally, it will discuss
biases and factors of decision-making that impact individuals’ abilities to identify incorrect information
on social media.

Information Challenges Defined
This report uses three key terms to describe false or misleading information types: misinformation,
disinformation, and malinformation. Misinformation refers to false information presented as a fact, not
shared with the intent to harm. For example, if someone retweets a news story not realizing the
information is incorrect, this would be considered misinformation. In contrast, disinformation is untrue or
semi-truthful content presented as fact and spread maliciously. Disinformation could include spreading
false information to manipulate people to support a particular viewpoint or to incite chaos and discord.
Finally, malinformation describes truthful content shared out of context with the intent of misleading or
manipulating the audience (CISA, n.d.).
Disinformation campaigns are not a new concept, however. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s
premier intelligence agency, the KGB, launched a campaign known as Operation “Denver” (Selvage,
2020). They pushed the hypothesis that AIDS resulted from failed experiments by U.S. government
biological weapons labs, dismissing the correct claim that HIV originated in Africa. In coordination with
the intelligence agencies of other Soviet countries, such as the East German Ministry for State Security,
the campaign shared forged documents and testimonies of purported experts to undermine the United
States’ reputation on the world stage. For a complex set of political and social reasons, some world
leaders and members of the public quickly believed in this conspiracy theory, further aiding in its spread
across the globe (Selvage, 2020).
This campaign was so effective that a 2005 study published in the Journal of Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome found that 26.6% of the African Americans they surveyed supported the claim that
AIDS was created in U.S. government laboratories. 53.4% of the respondents agreed that a cure exists for
AIDS but is withheld from poor communities (Bogart & Thorburn, 2005). The distrust of government
institutions that leads people to accept these conspiracy theories reflects the community trauma of decades
of mistreatment of Black Americans by the U.S. government. Thus, when examining the public’s support
of suspect content and conspiracy theories, it is important to be aware of the social and political history
and tensions that influence the public’s orientations on these issues.
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More recently, the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence identified
over 36,000 Twitter bot accounts and 450 Facebook pages linked to the Russian government involved in
spreading information about the 2016 U.S. presidential election (U.S. House). This coordinated campaign
attempted to portray Donald Trump favorably while casting Hillary Clinton in a negative light (Linvill et
al., 2019). Russia also purchased over 3,000 Facebook ads, exploiting Facebook’s advertising algorithms
to target U.S. users (Linvill et al., 2019). Disinformation in elections is not limited to the United States,
though. Attempts to influence elections via social media have also been reported in South America,
Europe, Africa, and Asia (Downing & Ahmed, 2019; Ferreira, 2022; Ndlela & Mano, 2020; Neyazi,
2020; Uyheng & Carley, et al., 2020).
Many countries have also used online tools to suppress dissent. For instance, during the Hong Kong
protests against China’s controversial Extradition Bill, government-sponsored media used Twitter to
discredit protesters and increase support for police forces (Wood et al., 2019). In the People’s Republic of
China, the government controls digital media to suppress ideas opposing its agenda and influence
countries’ and individuals’ stances on Taiwanese and Hong Kong’s independence.
If successful, false or misleading information campaigns can erode the public’s faith in the media and
trust in the government, divide the public, and rewrite history. As the political landscape becomes more
polarized and social issues worsen, it becomes increasingly easy for foreign governments to manipulate
social media users.
News Outlets’ Role in Deceit
When assessing the potential role of news outlets in sharing dis/mis/malinformation, it is important to
distinguish between state-controlled media and privately-owned media. State-controlled media companies
do not have independent editorial control over the stories they release. They often share information
portraying the state in a favorable light and the opposition negatively, regardless of its accuracy. China
Central Television is an example of state-controlled media (Bleck & Michelitch, 2017). An important
distinction is that just because a media company is state-funded does not mean that its respective
government controls it. For example, the BBC is funded by the British government but has independent
control over its editorial guidelines and so, therefore, is less prone to pushing false information (BBC,
n.d.-a, n.d.-b). Sometimes it can be challenging to distinguish state-sponsored publications from private
ones, however, as they can appear privately owned to an untrained eye. In many case studies, state-run
media is a country's primary source of information (Walker & Orttung, 2014). This lack of diversity in
information sources may create situations where citizens accidentally propagate false information given to
them by the government.
Even when an outlet is privately owned, it is difficult to banish misinformation entirely. In a Harvard
study of the 2016 election, researchers found that traditional news sources were a more significant source
of dis/misinformation than Russian-operated/owned ones. Furthermore, they noted that Russian
disinformation campaigns would only be successful with their stories being reported on and amplified by
general news sources (Farris et al., 267-268). News outlets often must rely on sensationalist stories to
attract viewers and profit: Donald Trump's tweets were a prime example of this issue. Very few
Americans learned of Trump's tweets through his Twitter feed. Instead, news outlets were most people's
first exposure to his tweets, which was an issue because nearly two-thirds of the news outlets did not
include a disclaimer that his claims were false (Patterson, 2020). Even routine journalism practices can
accidentally deceive audiences, allowing misinformation to spread.
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Decision-making: Biases & Rationality
Heuristics and biases can impact humans’ ability to make rational decisions. It is important to understand
the influences these biases and heuristics have as it allows for better decision-making and improved
information literacy, including assessing the accuracy of sources of information. Fortunately, decisionmaking is a learned skill and can be improved with experience and practice. Rational decision-making is
defined in the following subsections, and several examples of processes that interfere with reasoned
judgments are presented.

Rational Decision-making
Rational decision-making is when one makes decisions based on reason or logic. Seven steps are
involved in making reasoned decisions (Uzonwanne, 2016).
1. Identify the problem – This involves clearly defining the context and scope of the
problem, as it is challenging to address a problem if it is not well understood. For Watch
Officers, the challenge is already reasonably well understood: identifying
dis/misinformation on social media. Training or other educational strategies can address
any gaps in understanding the problem.
2. Identify what a solution looks like – It is important to know when a solution is reached by
clearly defining the characteristics of a solution. For Watch Officers, the solution is
generally a decision on whether a post should be trusted and amplified to higher
departments.
3. Conduct gap analysis – This involves identifying the space between the problem and a
solution. This gap is often similar across many social media posts that Watch Officers
might be analyzing. Generally, when first looking at a post, a reader is missing
information about the user’s profile, their activity on the platform, the activity
surrounding the topic on the platform, and potentially background information on the
event or conflict.
4. Gather facts, options, and alternatives – It is necessary to conduct background research
on the topic to be informed when making decisions and understand the different
stakeholders. In a context requiring rapid decision-making, online tools can expedite the
process of assessing tweets’ validity. Further, developing a working knowledge of major
conflicts and political tensions worldwide can make it simpler to gauge what dynamics
might be at play in a post or claim of a new event.
5. Analyze option outcomes – It is essential to consider the costs and benefits of each
possible outcome because they factor into choosing the best decision. When deciding
whether posts online are correct, this step involves evaluating the outcomes of amplifying
or choosing not to amplify a message. It is important to consider the adverse effects of
both options and the magnitude of those harms.
6. Select the best options – After reviewing possible outcomes, select the outcome that
minimizes costs and optimizes benefits.
7. Implement decision and evaluate - Once making the decision, it is important to assess
whether it was the correct decision and reflect on how it might impact similar future
decisions (Uzonwanne, 2016). Watch Officers could achieve this by creating a classified
data set on past decisions and whether they were accurate. This data set could help
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identify what misled Officers in past incorrect decisions, as well as help to curate a
dataset to train machine learning algorithms to automate some of these decisions.
Rational decision-making may seem like a long process, but individuals usually run through
these steps in their heads quickly. The importance of this model is that it demonstrates how
decision-making is a learned skill and can be improved. Watch Officers cannot make intuitive
decisions influenced by irrational influences. Habits, conformity, and cultural bias are common
irrational decision-making influences. (Tsohou et al., 2015). Habits can be harmful—just
because an action feels familiar does not always indicate it is correct. Conformity is when one
chooses what they think other people may choose. One may have overheard a co-worker or
someone in a higher position than oneself speak on a topic, and when they subsequently see an
article, they may be more apt to believe it (Tsohou et al., 2015).
Lastly, cultural and religious beliefs can influence mental processes. When a decision-maker
chooses an action based on cultural or religious convictions, biases in that action should be
acknowledged.
Heuristics and Biases
Heuristics and biases can be helpful--biases allow individuals to make inferences about underlying
processes, and heuristics serve as simple judgment rules that expedite or shorten the decision-making
process. However, when applied inappropriately or excessively, they can lead to errors in the resulting
judgments (Adame, 2016). Recognizing that several common biases and heuristics influence decisionmaking allows for more logical decision-making that is less affected by bias. Below are listed several
common heuristics in the judgment and decision-making process with definitions and potential strategies
for avoiding using them when making crucial decisions.
The Anchoring Effect
The anchoring effect occurs when an individual biases future estimates of a numerical value to fall closer
than random to a previous value or estimate they had read or been told, even if that value was incorrect
(Adame, 2016). This numerical value or ‘anchor’ serves as a starting point. These anchors can be
arbitrary and come from knowledge and experience, attitudes and preferences, other people, or inferences
based on certain proximity cues (Doherty & Carroll, 2020). An example of a harmful use of this heuristic
would be if social media users are exposed to false statistics on a controversial topic or from a public
opinion poll online. If asked to make their estimates of these statistics, they will likely anchor those
estimates on recollections of the false statistics they have seen online, even if subconsciously. Researchers
have identified that encouraging individuals to create self-generated reasons for how anchoring values
could be false or presenting them with a list of reasons to choose from is effective in helping to mitigate
the anchoring effect (Adame, 2016).
The Availability Heuristic
The availability heuristic technique is used when individuals base their judgment of what is most likely
on how easily they can recall an example. More frequent events are easier to recall and imagine than
infrequent ones. Media coverage and reporting can distort the perceived frequency of different events. For
example, people’s fear of a particular type of catastrophe, especially when disproportionate to the actual
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risk, likely reflects the media’s level of coverage of that type of event (Doherty & Carroll, 2020; Sunstein,
2006). This fear can, in turn, impact individuals’ ability to assess the accuracy of new information, as they
base those judgments on their ability to recall examples of similar cases in the past.
Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias refers to people’s general receptiveness to new information that supports their beliefs
and past judgment versus their reluctance toward information that contradicts those convictions. While
often discussed in the context of ideology, confirmation bias can also impact judgments on information
related to beliefs about the character or typical behavior patterns of another state or world leader.
Furthermore, a recent study indicates that in conjunction with reluctance to accept contradictory
information, confirmation bias tends to lead people to discount opposing opinions even if the strength of
the information backing the opinion emphasizes its credibility (Kappes et al., 2020). This highlights the
importance of individuals’ objectively analyzing the credibility of sources and the value of identifying
their opinions about social media posts and other media to understand better how confirmation bias could
appear in their judgments.
State Actors
Different states use different methods to spread disinformation, and they benefit politically, socially, and
financially from sowing dis/misinformation in the international sphere. This section will focus on China,
Russia, and Iran and their different goals and tactics. China, like Iran, is focused on improving its image
internationally and manipulating public opinion on domestic political conflicts. In contrast, Russia aims to
flood the internet with dis/misinformation, focusing on eroding truth to create distrust on a global scale.
China primarily employs astroturfing and trolling, although current efforts point toward using nationalist
hackers in the future (Harold et al., 2021). Russia focuses on flooding social media with accounts,
catfishing, and paying hackers to do their work (Treyger et al., 2022). Iran uses proxy sites and a vast
network of Facebook and Instagram pages to disseminate state propaganda and catfish western journalists
(Brooking & Kianpour, 2020). All three have communicated dis/misinformation in multiple languages.
They generally focus more on open platforms such as Facebook and Twitter than closed messaging
platforms like Telegram and WhatsApp. Further, China and Russia have noted the U.S. intelligence’s
reliance on social media to get information (Harold et al., 2021; Treyger et al., 2022).

China’s Approach to Social Media
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) focuses on monitoring its domestic and international audiences.
From Chairman Mao’s slogans to Deng Xiaoping’s posters, Chinese governments have a long history of
using propaganda to promote political agendas at home and abroad. Twitter and other social media
platforms are merely a new form of this historic practice. Though China has banned Twitter, Meta,
WhatsApp, Google, and other commonly used social media platforms, it does use these platforms to
spread misinformation to users abroad. NPR reported several bids by Chinese government agencies to
purchase followers on Twitter and Facebook (Wood et al., 2019). For example, the Chinese state-run
outlet China News offered 1.25 million yuan ($176,900) to acquire more Twitter followers (“zhōng guó
xīn wén shè zhōng xīn shè [China News Agency]”, 2019).
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Social Media Tactics
China uses a combination of astroturfing, discrediting enemy leadership, and trolling on social media
(Harold et al., 2021). In the past, China has used few bots, unlike Russia. However, that has started to
change in the last couple of years. The CCP prefers open platforms such as Facebook over closed
platforms like WhatsApp because open, public platforms make it easier to obtain data regarding the
effectiveness of their disinformation campaigns. Additionally, disinformation can be disseminated faster
on these platforms than on closed social media. Finally, China spreads disinformation in multiple
languages (Wood et al., 2019). For example, Twitter and Facebook both announced that Chinese-backed
social media accounts released posts written in English targeting the Hong Kong protests.
Concerningly, Chinese military authors have recognized the United States’ reliance on open-source
information for intelligence operations, such as the State Department’s Operation Center’s social media
monitoring. The Rand Corporation identified catfishing, “the use of fake identities designed to lure people
into the mistaken belief that they have developed an online relationship (romantic or professional),” as a
mechanism the Chinese government hopes to use to coax those with access into divulging classified
material (Harold et al., 2021). Chinese military authors also attempt to amplify the voices of people who
echo their beliefs, including retweeting celebrities and hacking their accounts (Harold et al., 2021). China
is also open to outsourcing social media messaging and disinformation. For instance, after Tsai Ing-wen
was elected president of Taiwan, thousands of Chinese users accessed Facebook to complain on IngWen’s page. Chinese military authors pointed to this ‘Diba Expedition’ as being tacitly approved by the
CCP, indicating that this behavior will become normalized over time (Harold et al., 2021).

Recommendations
•
•
•
•

Raise awareness of China’s dis/misinformation tactics.
American agencies should establish a trusted online presence on domestic media and possibly
even create one on Chinese platforms.
Reach out to and build trust with Chinese Americans, Taiwanese Americans, and Hong Kong
Americans.
Build a database of examples of Chinese dis/misinformation on social media to reference
when making judgments on social media posts.

Russia’s Approach to Social Media
Russia has viewed social media as a tool of the West that they can use to spread their beliefs and wreak
havoc (Treyger et al., 2022). They were particularly interested in the power of social media after the color
revolutions of former Soviet states and the social media-coordinated Arab Spring uprisings. Rand
Corporation suggests that Russia has embraced social media for its many benefits: it is low-cost, can
reach large audiences, and makes it challenging to trace online behavior back to a state-sponsored
campaign. On social media, Russia focuses on stoking divisions within Western states, promoting
Russian foreign policy narratives, supporting military action involving active warfare, and targeting
elections and political/social circumstances in certain countries.

Social Media Tactics
The Rand Corporation calls Russia's disinformation model the "Firehose of Falsehood" because of the
"high numbers of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or
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outright fictions" (Paul & Matthews, 2016). Messages are continuous, repetitive, and inconsistent, with
accounts sometimes contradicting each other. Russia's disinformation outside of former Soviet Union
states increased after 2014, the year of Russia's annexation of Crimea. Despite this cited activity, some
assert that Russia's disinformation campaigns are poorly organized and funded and that their impacts on
Western countries remain uncertain.
These information efforts are contributed to by a mixture of state, state-affiliated, and non-state actors,
ranging from YouTube channels like Russia Today (RT) to hackers supporting the Russian government
(Treyger et al., 2022). This mix is advantageous for the Russian government as it allows their leaders to
blame online activity on Russians acting to support the government rather than blaming it on the online
activity of the Kremlin itself.
State-affiliated actors, like the YouTube channels RT and Sputnik, are protected under the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, as they are news organizations. Thus, they cannot be treated as
hackers. Troll farms are another type of state actor. Like China, Russian leadership seems to pay bloggers
and others to post pro-Kremlin pieces. Russia has also begun outsourcing its work to freelance hackers,
which is relatively cost-effective. For example, a group of researchers hired Russian cyberhackers to
attack a fake website. In two weeks, they created 730 posts from 25 different Twitter accounts and
generated 100 posts on various forums and blogs, and the researchers only had to pay $250 (Greenberg,
2019).
Russia employs the vilification of enemy leadership, multiple platforms, astroturfing, troll farms, and
catfishing to learn a target's personal details and run campaigns in various languages (Treyger et al.,
2022). Russia also targets and harasses critics and people who expose misdeeds. These efforts can include
targeting officials and celebrities and leaking personal information, sometimes in altered form. Russia
uses a variety of platforms and blogs, including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, 4chan, Pinterest,
Reddit, Tumblr, LiveJournal, and 9GAG. They have also looked into encrypted platforms such as
WhatsApp and Telegram. They often set up fake accounts that sometimes have extensive histories and
use stock images for profile photos. A DFR lab report found that Russian operatives were behind dozens
of fake accounts on 30 platforms in 9 languages (Nimmo et al., 2019). They also target specific users
using Facebook ads.
Russia will amplify native content on its news sites as well as try to organize rallies. Regarding rallies,
they will try to pit opposing sides against each other, such as having suspected Russian actors pit antifascist demonstrators against Germany's far-right movement in Berlin during the 2019 European
Parliament elections (Apuzzo & Satariano, 2019).

Recommendations
•

•

Highlight how Russian actors try to manipulate people rather than individually refute
everything they create (that would be exhausting and perhaps impossible when they make so
much conflicting information).
Fine or sanction Russian news sources that spread Kremlin ideals, such as RT.
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•
•

Identify the objectives of a specific campaign and, rather than refute the propaganda, find
other ways to spoil their objective.
Make the public and government officials media literate in the complex tools these actors use
on social media (ex: astroturfing and catfishing).

Iran’s Approach to Social Media
Iran embraced the internet early on. Its universities had an online presence by 1993, and it was the second
Middle Eastern country to embrace the internet (behind Israel). Iran differs from Russia and China in that
it has very consistent disinformation campaigns that have gone on for years. According to the Atlantic
Council, it was as early as 2009 that Ayatollah Khamenei stated that “content promotion” was “the most
effective international weapon” against foreign adversaries (Brooking & Kianpour, 2020). The IRIB, the
office of the supreme leader, the intelligence services, the IRGC and associated militias, and the regular
Iranian military seem to each employ their own Internet operatives. However, it is unclear if they
collaborate. The Atlantic Council believes Iran will continue to lean into clandestine digital activities due
to U.S. sanctions and increasing scrutiny of its public entities.

Social Media Tactics
Iran uses proxy sites, fake accounts, astroturfing, troll farms, a network of content-focused Facebook and
Instagram pages, and catfishing (Brooking & Kianpour, 2020). The proxy sites regurgitate state media,
with many proxy sites reporting on each other’s news. Unlike commercial information mills, these sites
can be identified because they have no ads. Some versions try to make it seem like they are the official
sites of foreign media outlets. Sometimes, this is done through something as straightforward as a
misleading domain name (ex. “tel-avivtimes.com”), and other times it involves plagiarism or clever
misspellings. Fake social media accounts are interested in promoting and leading normal social media
users to their proxy sites; however, these fake accounts generally do not appear convincing. Contentfocused pages have similar goals as fake accounts but aim to promote Iranian propaganda. Some more
sophisticated groups will even target specific Western journalists via catfishing (Brooking & Kianpour,
2020). The Atlantic Council emphasized Iran’s reach with these accounts, noting that “through Facebook
especially, Iran has built hundreds of region-specific pages that have reached millions of users in every
corner of the world”.

Recommendations
•
•

•
•

Invest resources in identifying and neutralizing (but not sensationalizing) Iran’s digital
influence networks.
Use automated search and text-matching of Iranian state propaganda products. If the State
Department chooses a machine learning solution, they must create a declassified data set for
American developers to train AI, but they must not disclose this data to the foreign
adversaries behind the disinformation operations.
Address regular press briefings to the Iranian people. The attacks by Iran work best when
they go unanswered.
Work with social media companies to find and shut down foreign influence operations
because much of the work currently falls on private enterprises.
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Types of Disinformation
Multimedia Manipulation (Deepfakes, Memes, and Out-of-Context Images)
With recent advances in artificial intelligence, a new wave of multimedia manipulation has begun in the
form of deepfakes, memes, and out-of-context images. Deepfakes include algorithm-edited photos,
videos, and audio, that generally depict a person saying or doing something that did not happen. They
have the “potential to rapidly spread false words and actions to a global audience and can be extremely
difficult to distinguish from real content” (Lam, 2021). Deepfakes often promote emotions and beliefs
already held by the intended audience, reaffirming those convictions. While deepfakes can be challenging
to identify without extensive knowledge of artificial intelligence because they appear realistic, the general
population has recognized some deepfakes produced by Russia, China, and Iran. Despite the potential
effectiveness of these methods, the impact they have on spreading dis/misinformation is unclear, as
researchers claim “[deepfakes have not] yet shaped major world events” (Yankoski et al., 2021).
Memes are another type of manipulated media known as “shallow fakes”. A shallow fake meme is an
image (or occasionally a video) repurposed from its original use to make a humorous statement. Memes
typically contain a short amount of text to alter the actual meaning of the image and usually reference
current events. While deepfakes are generated by artificial intelligence technology and aim to look
realistic, shallow fakes can be manually manipulated, and the quality can significantly vary (Yankoski et
al., 2021). The minimal skills required to create memes make them accessible to most, meaning in
contrast to deepfakes, memes are produced at a quicker rate (Yankoski et al., 2021).
Older photos used out of context are a form of malinformation used to deceive viewers and promote a
false narrative. In contrast with memes, out-of-context images do not have humorous intentions and are
not attempting to make a statement about a social issue. Instead, these photos from past events are stolen
and reassigned with incorrect captions to mislead audiences into believing a new event has occurred.
These images are harmful because people are more likely to trust the veracity of a news story or social
media post if the false claim is paired with photos confirming the alleged event, even if, unknown to the
audience, the images are from a different, past event (Fazio, 2020).
There are rising concerns about multimedia manipulation as technology advances since “they challenge
real footage and undermine the credibility of civic media and frontline witnessing” (Gregory, 2022).
Furthermore, when constantly confronted with manipulated content, social media users could question all
information sources they encounter.

Case Study: China
Most deepfakes observed in Chinese media are imperfectly fabricated videos. However, they have similar
effects to well-created deepfakes because the messages of these videos still aid deceptive media users in
spreading false information in support of their agendas. For example, in 2018, Chinese deepfakes covered
the internet as the development of new apps for creating AI-manipulated videos increased accessibility to
users with minimal AI knowledge (Seta, 2021). This increased access caused deepfake videos to surface
on social media sites, such as WeChat, that implied the occurrence of events that never happened. These
deepfake videos included a video of President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
singing 'Wo Ai Ni Zhongguo' [我爱你中国 'I Love You, China'], a patriotic Chinese song (Seta, 2021).
While this video was widely accepted as fake news, there are still reasons for concern. Stories or media
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posts based on the video could lead to an even wider spread of this manufactured content where the
original deepfake video is not linked, preventing users from assessing the quality and accuracy of the
video. Also, while the public generally accepted this video as fake, this does not mean that future, higherquality deepfake videos could not trick or polarize online users more effectively.

Case Study: Russia
Russia has also used deepfakes to spread disinformation despite the often amateur quality and flaws
apparent to those even untrained in artificial intelligence. In March 2022, during the Russian-Ukraine
War, Russia posted a deepfake portraying Volodymyr Zelensky telling Ukrainians to "put down their
weapons" on a hacked news website (Broinowski, 2022). While the deepfake was easy to categorize as
disinformation due to its poor quality, "digital forensics expert Hany Farid described it as 'the tip of the
iceberg,' in a global information war increasingly characterized by the use of deepfakes to spread military
propaganda" (Broinowski, 2022). Further, in 2021, UK and EU officials conducted several video calls
with Leonid Volkov, Alexei Navalny's chief-of-staff, only to realize later that they had been discussing
the sensitive information with a deepfake of the man engineered by the Russian using AI simulation
(Broinowski, 2022).
While the memes are intended to be humorous, they also can amplify fake news narratives. The use of
memes in Russia peaked during the COVID-19 pandemic and often used images and concepts related to
the Soviet Union in the 1990s (Borenstein, 2022). Some memes took 1990s movie quotes and altered
them to fit situations related to the pandemic (Borenstein, 2022). Other memes were created from fake
news stories, further amplifying that disinformation (Borenstein, 2022). For example, fake news about
wildlife returning due to lock-ins resulted in the production of memes quoting, "30 days of quarantine in
Italy: the dolphins are back. 30 days of quarantine in Wales: the wild goats are back. 30 days in
quarantine in Russia: the 90s are back" (Borenstein, 2022). Fake news about the return of wildlife might
be a more innocuous example, but these patterns point to future, more severe possibilities of
disinformation coming from Russia.Case Study: Iran
In July of 2018, an Iranian Facebook account posted a doctored image of Tom Hanks wearing a shirt with
phrases including “Science is Real”, “Black Lives Matter”, and “No Human is Illegal” in order to gain
followers on a propaganda account called "No racism no war" (Madrigal, 2018). According to Facebook,
this account posted about "politically charged topics such as race relations, opposition to the President,
and immigration" which ultimately led to its removal from the platform, but not before it was able to
acquire 400,000 likes (Madrigal, 2018).

Case Study: Other Examples to Consider
The use of manipulated media is not limited to China, Russia, and Iran. The Flemish Socialist Party and
an alt-right Israeli group have utilized notable deepfake campaigns to polarize discussions on political
issues (Broinowski, 2022). For example, in 2018, the Flemish Socialist Party promoted a deepfake of
Trump, encouraging Belgians to no longer side with the Paris Climate agreement. Some party members
believed the video, despite its technical flaws and the Flemish Socialist Party's use of the video to incite
debate and further political tensions (Broinowski, 2022). Additionally, an alt-right Israeli group produced
deepfake videos utilizing 'sock puppets' ("synthetic humans generated from deepfake photographs").
These videos depicted previous supporters of the political left, expressing their change of heart on
political discord and sharing that they now supported Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the political
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right (Broinowski, 2022). Zionist Spring, a heavily conservative account, posted the videos on their
Facebook page. (Broinowski, 2022).

Recommendations
• Learn how to detect and practice (by clicking the “PLAY” button) identifying false and
edited images with resources such as https://www.whichfaceisreal.com/learn.html.
• Use reverse image searches to check for out-of-context images or memes using tools such
as https://tineye.com/.
• Consider that sometimes the most harmful deepfakes and memes are not the highest
quality but are simply the most popular.
• Pay attention to the quality of videos (large pixels, poor audio, etc.), if the actions or
words seem out of place, and if there are any inconsistencies.
• Consider the account posting the deepfake or meme to understand if it is part of a
political media campaign. Consider user following, follower interactions, and what kinds
of accounts are posting similar information.

Bots
Social media accounts classified as bots are fully automated and do not require human intervention
(Nimmo, 2018). This contrasts with cyborgs, which involve a combination of pre-programmed
functionality and human activity (Martini et al., 2021). Bots can have a variety of innocuous
functionalities, including posting weather alerts and news stories; however, the focus of this discussion is
bots with malicious intent (Nimmo, 2018). Many large-scale disinformation campaigns use bot swarms or
botnets, large groups of bot accounts that perform similar tasks (Jones, 2019); (Nimmo, 2018).
Individuals or groups responsible for disinformation campaigns can design these bots themselves or
purchase “commercial” bots for rent to gain retweets, likes, or follows (Nimmo, 2018).
The rising presence of bots presents many challenges regarding spreading information on social media
platforms. One of the most prevalent functions of malicious social bots is the retweeting of posts based on
hashtags or other metrics. This functionality is much easier to program than other abilities that more
closely mimic human behavior (Martini et al., 2021). Even small percentages of bots are sufficient to
cause shifts in opinion on social media. For example, only 0.5% of Nicolás Maduro’s followers were
bots, but when Twitter banned them from their platform, retweets of Maduro’s posts decreased by 81%
(Martini et al., 2021). This ability of bots to artificially inflate the popularity of hashtags on Twitter can
give the false impression of public support for certain positions or ideas (Jones, 2019; Stieglitz et al.,
2017). Because it is difficult to design programs capable of replicating human writing patterns, bots often
do not generate their tweets. A more common mechanism is making posts with many hashtags or links to
other sources created by a human (Jones, 2019). This approach makes it less obvious that a bot made the
post. Also, it serves as another mechanism to create fake trends on Twitter that are not reflective of trends
in public opinion. These two techniques create artificial trends and these trends and masses of support
potentially obscure actual trends on Twitter. Or they can create such spam associated with a hashtag that
the hashtag is no longer usable (Jones, 2019).
Unfortunately, as artificial intelligence advances, bots become even harder to detect. According to a study
published in 2021, humans retweet bot and non-bot posts at the same rate, suggesting that even now,
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users do not distinguish significantly between automated and manual accounts (Martini et al., 2021). The
structure and policies of social media platforms further complicate the ability of researchers to gather
information about bots and technologies to detect and combat them. Often, Twitter does not release data
on statistics regarding bot accounts, making it difficult to curate datasets for training algorithms. Also,
techniques of bots, social media platforms, and trending topics constantly evolve, so datasets quickly
become outdated, and algorithms need to be re-trained (Martini et al., 2021).

Case Study: Bots in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
In 2022, Smart, et al., completed a study on bot and non-bot identities of tweets on the invasion of
Ukraine by Russia from February 23 to March 8, 2022. Researchers identified pro-Ukraine and proRussia accounts by searching hashtags on Twitter. They classified 90.16% of these accounts as proUkraine and only 6.80% as pro-Russia, but Russia has a much longer history of using bots. They found
that Russian non-bot accounts have the highest information flows to other groups, and bots amplify the
messaging from non-bot accounts. For example, following Russia's capture of Kherson, an increase in
#(I)StandWithPutin correlated with an increase in bot activity on the Twitter platform, suggesting that this
trend originated at least partially by artificial means.
Further, while Russian accounts have significant out-group activity, Pro-Ukrainian groups have high ingroup flow and minimal out-group flow, indicating Ukrainian accounts infiltrate discussions of their less
than Russian accounts do. Finally, researchers found that self-declared bots increase discussions on many
topics and have a powerful influence on discussions surrounding politics and the government. As these
accounts were mostly in English, the researchers speculated that they could target users from Western
countries with these tweets (Smart, 2022).
This research is interesting as it points to bot and non-bot accounts' different roles in influencing online
discussions. Automated and non-automated accounts can work in tandem to amplify messages through ingroup and out-group interactions. It also points to the need to consider the audience when analyzing the
impacts and credibility of tweets. For example, language can give clues to the intent behind tweets and
accounts, giving social media users clues to their credibility and how to interpret the information being
shared.

Case Study: Bots in the Gulf Crisis of 2018
Another conflict in which bots had a central role was a dispute between Qatar and the Quartet: the United
Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. The conflict erupted when Qatar’s head of state
released a tweet in support of Iran in the spring of 2017. This tweet angered the Quartet as they felt it
violated the foreign policy objectives of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Qatar alleged someone hacked the
emir’s account and that the emir himself had not written these comments (Jones, 2019).
In the five years leading up to this conflict, about 318 accounts were created on Twitter per month. In
May 2017, this number jumped to 3,347. Many of these accounts had similar metadata: they were all
created on the web and had similar profiles, including poor-quality images for their profile pictures
(Jones, 2019). There are suspicions that these were bot swarms set up in advance or that Saudi Arabia
hired commercial bots to amplify their messaging (Jones, 2019; Nimmo, 2018). The fact that General
Supervisor al-Qahtani of Saudi Arabia published many of the hashtags that went viral in support of the
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Quartet’s campaign further implicates Saudi Arabia in using social media to launch a coordinated
campaign against Qatar. For example, of the 2,116 retweets Turki Al-Shekh received for an anti-Qatar
tweet, 1,600 were attributed to bots (Jones, 2019). These amplification methods had far-reaching
implications as even BBC Arabic picked up on these trending hashtags and reported on these false
impressions of popularity in mainstream news (Jones, 2019). This emphasizes the large-scale impact
Twitter bots can have on shaping media coverage. The engineers behind the bots also used other
techniques to give the false impression of genuine public backlash, such as setting the location of
accounts to Qatar to make the users seem like citizens of Qatar (Jones, 2019; Nimmo, 2018).
Although Saudi Arabia and the Quartet likely heavily manipulated social media to their advantage, Qatar
also employed social media to promote its own agenda. Pro-Qatar tweets often received hundreds of
retweets in just two seconds, and researchers traced these to commercial bot accounts rather than real
people (Nimmo, 2018). This case study points to further techniques for identifying bots spreading
misinformation. First, many of the accounts purchased by both sides had repetitive Twitter handles and
grainy or stock images for photos and had previously posted on non-political topics (Nimmo, 2018).
Additionally, those setting up accounts often chose locations for the profiles to give the false impression
of a specific nation’s support of a particular ideology or claim, cautioning those assessing the veracity of
tweets to rely on metrics such as location when making quick judgments (Jones, 2019). This research on
social media’s role in the crisis also suggests that rapid spikes in retweets or account creation potentially
indicate bot involvement. Finally, the role of BBC Arabic in spreading false trends on social media
cautions that even mainstream media organizations can misinterpret Twitter trends and contribute to the
spread of dis/misinformation.

Recommendations
Distinguishing bots from humans
While humans cannot surpass algorithms in distinguishing bots from non-bots, some simple metrics can
be helpful when making quick judgments (Martini et al., 2021). While bots attempt to imitate human
behavior, they tend to include more links in their tweets and focus more on retweeting content than
human users (Stieglitz et al., 2017). However, programmers adjust other aspects of bots’ behavior to
mimic that of humans. For example, some bots take breaks to imitate sleep, and some bots can slightly
modify the text of reposts so as not to trigger Twitter’s bot detectors (Stieglitz et al., 2017). Lastly, bot
accounts often post with much greater frequency than non-bot accounts. While some debate exists on
what cutoff to use, some researchers suggest that users posting more than 144 times a day are likely bots
(Nimmo, 2018). However, single-indicator methods, such as the number of daily posts, have limitations.
Most single-indicators imprecisely partition data, and they will exclude bot accounts with low activity.
Furthermore, they are unlikely to surpass the performance of algorithms using the indicator as a parameter
(Martini et al., 2021).
Technology for detecting bots and its pitfalls

Automated tools are a promising option, given the challenges of detecting bots manually, but
they come with their limitations. Martini et al. published a study in 2021 comparing two
prominent bot detection tools: Botometer and Tweetbotornot. Many well-known organizations,
such as PEW Research Center, use Botometer, and the programmers who designed the tool used
a diverse training set with many types of bots. When tested, Botometer produced both high false
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positive and high false negative rates. Since then, the creators of Botometer have modified the
algorithm to predict specific types of bots rather than the general labels of bot or non-bot,
improving the accuracy as the algorithm no longer has to generalize to patterns only seen across
all types of bots. In contrast, Tweetbotornot primarily focuses on identifying bots involved in
disinformation campaigns within the United States, limiting its usefulness for detecting bots in
other contexts. When Martini et al. ran these algorithms on the same dataset, they found minimal
overlap in the bots detected by these two algorithms, emphasizing the need for caution when
interpreting results from such online tools (Martini et al., 2021).
As discussed previously, one principal limitation in designing such tools is the availability of
relevant data to train the algorithms. Algorithms make classifications based on what they have
already seen, so the predictive model will have low accuracy if the training data does not
represent the test data. For example, Tweetbotornot likely would perform poorly when detecting
bots not designed to spread disinformation domestically. Botometer would struggle to detect bots
not falling under one of the identified six bot types. Additionally, as bots continually evolve, the
training datasets and, thus, the algorithms quickly become outdated. Genetic algorithms,
designed to mimic evolution, show promise in detecting evolving bots and compensating for
some limitations in available training data (Schuchard, 2019).
For these reasons, offices in the State Department using these tools must carefully consider the
training data used and the types of bots each algorithm can detect when selecting the tool(s) that
will best meet the goals of an office’s projects. For instance, a bot detector focused on US
elections would be a poor choice for Watch Officers focused on detecting bots meddling in
international affairs. One way to elucidate the effectiveness of several tools for a particular
project is to compile a dataset of correctly classified sample tweets.
Comparing the accuracies of several bot detection algorithms in classifying bot versus non-bot
could serve as a proxy for each algorithm’s likely performance on future data. A similar method
could determine the optimal classification threshold for each algorithm. Following this testing,
the State Department could inform employees about which tools they should use, with the most
accurate tools generally being the ones with the highest accuracy on the State Department’s
custom datasets.
Additionally, sometimes bot-detecting algorithms provide information on their training dataset
and scope. An extensive listing of bot detection tools can be found
here: https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truth-decay/fightingdisinformation/search.html#q=bot+detection. If all algorithms perform unsatisfactorily, it might
be worthwhile for a group to design an algorithm trained on bot classification data more relevant
to the scope of the project. This information can be used to judge which tools seem most
relevant; however, some of this data often gets withheld by the algorithm creators as too much
transparency can enable bots to evade detection (Martini et al., 2021).
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Recommendations
•
•
•
•
•

•

Use caution when using profile characteristics such as the location or number of followers for an
account, as it is easy for bot accounts to manipulate or inflate these.
Look to past characteristics of bot accounts to make quick judgments on the reliability and source
of information, such as repetitive Twitter handles, spikes in activity, and profile pictures.
Supplement human judgment with digital tools, such as bot-detection algorithms.
Choose which tools to use based on their performance on sample data representative of the types
of bots the State Department will detect.
Set classification thresholds for these tools based on which thresholds optimize classification
accuracies on sample data representative of the types of data the State Department will be
examining.
Routinely revisit decisions on protocols for bot identification tool use as bots continually evolve
and develop new strategies to evade detection.

Astroturfing and Trolling
Astroturfing occurs when a centralized disinformation campaign takes on the disguise of a grassroots
movement, often with the goal of convincing outsiders that popular support exists for an actor or idea.
Typically, astroturf networks follow the principal-agent theory: an overseer (principal) works with several
agents who do a task for the overseer. There is an information asymmetry between the overseer and the
agents because the overseer cannot constantly watch them, creating an incentive for the agents to take
shortcuts in their work (Keller et al., 2020). The result is many low-quality accounts that barely fulfill the
overseer’s requirements. Flaws in these accounts and their posts can provide clues that their source is
unreliable. Ideally, astroturfing campaigns can most accurately be detected by looking at the patterns in
networks of accounts versus individual accounts (Keller et al., 2022).
Trolling occurs when an account posts inflammatory, emotionally-charged content to rile up other users
and encourage them to respond similarly (Paavola et al., 2016). Because of this, tense political and social
climates can provide a breeding ground for trolls. Trolls’ comments often align with or target specific
ideological grounds, and in volatile sociopolitical content, real users are more sensitive to comments they
perceive as attacking their viewpoints (Sanfilippo, 2017). Because people are more reactive to posts
singling out their ideological identities, trolling can also amplify aggression surrounding political beliefs.

Case Study: Russia
Russian astroturfing efforts tend to follow the principal-agent model. The co-tweet network of the
Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) offers insight into how the government coordinates digital
action. False accounts post similar or identical content, even when such overlap may be contradictory; for
example, during the 2016 election, “the IRA campaign targeted both ends of the political spectrum and
therefore posted very different messages. But… research showed that left-wing trolls impersonating
Black Lives Matter activists and the right-wing accounts posted 1,661 identical tweets,” (Keller et al.,
2019). Because these false accounts often receive instructions from the principal simultaneously, many
Russian astroturfing accounts will post similar content within a short period. Interestingly, this short
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period frequently occurs during office hours in St. Petersburg (Keller et al., 2019). When trying to
identify astroturfing efforts, contradictory or identical content is a red flag.
Russian trolling techniques can be seen when studying health disinformation. A study of health topics
tweeted about by Russian trolls during the 2016 US presidential election revealed discussions on over 40
health-related issues, including 17 with significant differences between trolls mimicking left and right
political ideologies. For instance, right trolls, supporters of Donald Trump, focused much more on topics
such as Hillary Clinton’s health and health insurance policy than left trolls. In contrast, left trolls,
supporters of Bernie Sanders but not Hillary Clinton, emphasized topics like LGBT conversion therapy
and the Flint Water Crisis (Karami et al., 2021). When discussing these topics, trolls covered various
issues and sought topics that would promote divisive discourse.

Case Study: China
International perspectives on Chinese astroturfing are primarily concerned with the colloquial “50c
party,” named after rumors that ordinary citizens are paid 50 cents to combat agitating comments. This
prevailing view is incorrect; most 50c participants appear to be government employees and do not engage
in online debate. The overwhelming majority of the posts are simply government cheerleading as “most
50c posts from [the] data appear in highly coordinated bursts around events with collective action
potential—either after unexpected events or before periods such as the Qingming festival and political
meetings when the regime perceives collective action to be more likely” (King et al., 2017).
Chinese astroturfing is a widespread government effort; in the years preceding 2017, 50c participants
write about 448 million posts annually. 52.5% of the posts are on government sites, while 212 million are
inserted into social media sites. Posts appear to share similar content, occur quickly, and are coordinated
by a principal. The efforts rarely have a general focus, often featuring “specific intent and content” (King
et al., 2017). In this case, red flags for astroturfing include similar posts that spike when collective actions
are likely and if the posts are replies to government social media accounts.
China also utilizes 50c trolls for disruption and chaos. Like Russia, sometimes party-backed trolls engage
in opinion wars with foreign audiences, creating rifts and spreading confusion. Additionally, they are very
organized, with entire command structures of volunteers, which can increase the effectiveness of these
operations (Fedasiuk, 2021). Like Russia, they are used abroad and domestically and are the driving force
behind boycotts and harassment operations on domestic networks against foreign businesses and actors.
Finally, it is important to understand that just because networks like Twitter can catch many sock puppets
and trolls used by the CCP, they are still a threat, and more still need to be discovered (Fedasiuk, 2021).
China’s trolls are efficiently organized and follow a military format. Do not expect Chinese trolls to work
alone.

Case Study: Iran
Iranian usages of astroturfing are significant due in part to the government's early forays into digital
misinformation. Networks emphasize Iranian moral propaganda while downplaying international
criticisms, especially of human rights concerns and political repression. Iranian efforts seem to be focused
on influencing the opinion of Muslim populations in countries of indirect strategic importance (i.e.,
Indonesia and Nigeria). However, when Iranian disinformation networks focus on the US and its Western
allies, it is "to achieve definable foreign policy objectives" (Brooking & Kianpour, 2020). The level of
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coordination between the networks of accounts is complex because of the structural robustness of Iranian
media apparatuses:
“Broadly, Iran’s foreign influence efforts evidence a level of routinization that distinguish it from
Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, or any other nation that has built a digital influence apparatus. This
is a result of the early integration of digital manipulation into Iranian government and military
functions. In 2009, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that ‘content promotion’ was ‘the most effective
international weapon’ against foreign adversaries. In 2011, the head of the IRIB bragged that he
had developed seven cyber battalions of ‘media experts and specialists,’ supposedly consisting of
8,400 members. Tehran’s IRGC headquarters has trained thousands of recruits in ‘content
production,’ teaching them social media strategy and graphic design” (Brooking & Kianpour,
2020).
As of January 2020, there have been 1,114 Facebook and 344 Instagram accounts attributed to Iran,
followed by 439,000 users; on Twitter, there have been 7,896 accounts that have sent nearly 8.5 million
messages (Brooking & Kianpour, 2020). Suspicious accounts tend to refrain from disseminating blatant
disinformation and do not put much effort into creating false identities. Historically, such accounts
aggressively promote their material and adopt different personas to increase engagement. For example,
"an account called "Liberty Front Press" (named after an Iranian propaganda front) abruptly changed its
username to "Berniecrats." Even with the sudden identity switch, the account's content remained the
same" (Brooking & Kianpour, 2020). In other cases, Iranian accounts have created fake or masqueraded
as legitimate news sources to spread domestic propaganda abroad. After examining Iranian
disinformation efforts, likely red flags for astroturfing include abrupt account name changes and obvious
use of false accounts.
Though Russian and Chinese trolls get more attention, Iran has used trolls to interfere in Western politics.
For example, while Russian trolls were attaching Justin Trudeau, Iranian trolls "disseminated false reports
on Stephen Harper shortly before the 2015 Canadian election, suggesting that the CIA installed him as
prime minister and that he was an ISIS supporter" (Al-Rami, 2021). The interesting thing about Iranian
trolls is that, unlike Chinese and Russian trolls who sowed disruption by playing both sides or having a
strict command structure, they utilized humanitarian crises and human rights issues in their attacks (AlRami, 2021).

Recommendations
When evaluating if an account or post is suspect, Watch Officers should consider:
●

Does the post identify an owner, geographical location, or government affiliation?

●

Is similar or identical content posted across related or peer accounts?

●

Is the post within a cluster of other posts that have posted similar content within a short time?

● Is the post affiliated with a government employee of a country with a known history of online
disinformation?
●

Has the account abruptly changed names, content, language, or tone?

●

Did the post appear during normal office hours for its originating country?
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Conclusion
As technology continues to evolve and improve, online mis/disinformation is only becoming a more
pressing problem. Watch Officers monitoring social media and trying to assess the accuracy of posts
should lean on a solid understanding of the state of false or misleading information when making quick
decisions. Many mis/disinformation campaigns are patterned and utilized routinely by state actors, such
as China, Russia, and Iran. Familiarity with these patterns and common biases in Watch Officers’
assessments is critical to quickly and accurately identify disinformation. There are various recommended
techniques and questions that Watch Officers can utilize to sculpt a mindset that is conducive to spotting
irregularities that are indicative of disinformation.
There are many open-source tools available that can help spot disinformation and algorithms to detect bot
activity. Utilizing tools to detect dis/misinformation in multimedia manipulation and bots can assist with
determining the reliability of new information. It is important to note that when using these tools, frequent
preventative checks should be done to ensure that the information is up-to-date due to its constant
evolution.
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Addendum A - Watch Officer “Cheat Sheet”
Multimedia Manipulation
●

Consider that sometimes the most harmful deepfakes and memes are not the highest quality, but
are simply the most popular.

●

Pay attention to the quality of videos (large pixels, poor audio, etc.), if the actions or words said
seem out of place, and if there are any inconsistencies.

●

Consider the account posting the deepfake or meme to understand if it is part of a political media
campaign. Consider user following, follower interactions, what kinds of accounts are posting
similar information.

Bots
●

Use caution when using profile characteristics such as the location or number of followers for an
account as it is easy for bot accounts to manipulate or inflate these.

●

Look to past characteristics of bot accounts to make quick judgments on the reliability and source
of information, such as repetitive Twitter handles, spikes in activity, and profile pictures.

Astroturfing and Trolls
●

Does the post clearly identify an owner, geographical location, or government affiliation?

●

Does this post post similar or identical content to its peers?

●

Is the post within a cluster of other posts that have posted similar content within a short time
frame?

●

Is the post affiliated with a government employee of a country with a known history of online
disinformation?

●

Has the account abruptly changed names, content, language, or tone?

●

Did the post appear during routine office hours for its originating country?

Social Listening Dashboard
https://diplomacy-lab.lib.purdue.edu/tools/dashboard
Edited Image Identification Practice
Which Face is Real?
Reverse Image Checker
TinEye
Google Image Reverse Search
Information Literacy Modules
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https://diplomacy-lab.lib.purdue.edu/education/literacy-modules
Flowchart and Checklists
https://diplomacy-lab.lib.purdue.edu/tools/flowchart
Bot Detection
Botometer
Tweetbotornot
More tools can be found here: https://www.rand.org/research/projects/truthdecay/fightingdisinformation/search.html#q=bot+detection
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